Bouke de Vries: ‘Nowhere Have I Experienced Such a Stifling Ideological Climate as at Ghent University’

Bouke de Vries: The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge are collegiate universities, meaning that, in addition to holding a position at the university, you are also affiliated, on an unpaid basis, with a college — an organisation that provides things such as accommodation and dining facilities. Nathan’s college, Emmanuel College, expelled him because his views were allegedly incompatible with DEI, but he was never fired by the University of Cambridge. Quite the contrary. The university later expressly stated that Nathan’s remarks fell within the bounds of academic freedom and freedom of expression, and all 58 complaints against him were found to be unfounded.

The accusation that Cofnas advocates racial superiority also crops up regularly. That would mean not only that he was breaking the law, but, according to Pieter Beck of Ghent University, also that he was violating the university’s code of ethics. Beck refers, among other things, to Cofnas’s statement that, in a fully meritocratic society, black people would virtually disappear from high-status positions ‘outside of sports and entertainment’. Do you regard that as a statement about racial superiority?

Nathan based this statement on data from Harvard showing that, if students were admitted solely on the basis of academic criteria such as grades and test scores, the proportion of African-American students would fall to 0.7 per cent. Nathan’s reasoning was that, without affirmative action, there would be very few African-American professors, since the requirements for obtaining a professorship at a university such as Harvard are considerably higher still than those for admission as a student. According to him, the same applies to other occupations that impose exceptionally high cognitive demands.

'Nathan has always strongly opposed segregation'

Whether this constitutes a statement about racial superiority depends on what is meant by that term. If merely pointing to average group differences is already considered a claim of racial superiority, then virtually all intelligence researchers would be guilty of making such claims. The existence of average differences in cognitive test performance is, after all, widely accepted. The scientific debate concerns whether, and if so to what extent, these differences have a partly genetic basis. By the same reasoning, anyone who observes that people of East African ancestry are strongly overrepresented among the world’s best long-distance runners would also be making a claim about racial superiority.

Another — and, in my view, more obvious — meaning of racial superiority is the claim that certain ancestral groups (groups sharing a common geographical and genetic ancestry, ed.) are morally superior to other groups. But Nathan’s claim that certain groups would be more or less strongly represented in particular positions in the absence of affirmative action does not imply any moral hierarchy. Nathan himself has, moreover, always stressed that there is significant overlap between ancestral groups with regard to all socially relevant traits, and that this in itself is a reason to judge people as individuals, rather than on the basis of their race.

It is of course true that Cofnas wrote in a 2024 publication: ‘There must be some barriers set up between races in order for each one to express its own unique genius.’ Some readers interpret that as advocating segregation, which is prohibited under the university’s code of ethics.

A word of caution here: Nathan has always strongly opposed segregation. See, for example, his response from a few years ago when it was suggested that he supported segregation in education. What he meant by that statement, as he has explained it to me, is that he does not favour ‘a world government in which all of humanity speaks Esperanto’.

'If Nathan had not attracted so much controversy, he would be a serious candidate for an assistant professorship at many universities'

In other words, he believes it is desirable for existing ethnic and cultural diversity to be preserved to some extent at the global level, something that may in certain cases be difficult to reconcile with, for example, open borders. Another example concerns the distinctive character of the Jewish community, which he believes would be difficult to preserve if entry into Judaism were made too easy.

Critics also claim that Cofnas had no publications or demonstrable expertise on liberalism. Is that correct?

That is nonsense. He published an article on the development of liberalism in Philosophical Studies, one of the leading philosophy journals. There were sixteen other candidates, some of whom, incidentally, had applied for the wrong position or had submitted an empty application. Nathan’s existing work on liberalism, combined with his other excellent publications, made him stand out from the competition. If he had not attracted so much controversy, he would be a serious candidate for an assistant professorship at many universities. In this case, by contrast, it concerned a one-year, part-time research position — a position that would normally be well below the level for which someone like him would qualify.

The interim measure imposed on Cofnas — so these are not disciplinary measures, as has sometimes incorrectly been reported in the media — also stipulates that his research must be strictly confined to The Future of Liberalism. Research into race realism and a hereditarian revolution may not be conducted as part of this appointment. But what if those happen to be relevant research topics for the project?

The project Nathan is working on is indeed about the future of liberalism in the broad sense of the term: as an ideology advocating equal citizenship and extensive individual freedoms. I did not hire Nathan because of his work on race realism or his blog about the hereditarian revolution. (By ‘race realism’, Cofnas means that racial or ancestral groups can be distinguished genetically without having sharply defined boundaries. By ‘hereditarian revolution’, he advocates giving more explicit consideration to the genetic contribution to average group differences in political and societal debate, ed.) But it is indeed possible that his work on these subjects is relevant to the project.

'Recognising the influence of genes by no means necessarily leads to support for far-right politics'

As Nathan explains in a lecture for the Catholic Flemish Students’ Association in Ghent, woke ideology assumes, in his view, that ancestral groups do not differ on average in socially relevant characteristics such as intelligence. Differences in academic achievement and economic success — with Ashkenazi Jews and East Asians scoring highest — would, according to this view, have to be explained entirely by discrimination and racism against lower-scoring groups.

But explicit racism and discrimination have long been illegal in most Western countries and have, fortunately, become relatively rare. Large disparities in areas such as access to nutrition and education have also diminished substantially, while many governments invest large amounts of money in reducing educational inequalities.

If genetic influences are ruled out a priori, Nathan argues, it then becomes logical to attribute persistent unequal group outcomes to subtler forms of alleged racism and discrimination, such as microaggressions and implicit bias. According to him, this explains why adherents of woke ideology often support illiberal measures that conflict with freedom of expression and academic freedom: they regard such measures as necessary to combat these less visible but, in their view, highly damaging forms of racism and discrimination.

You have already mentioned the role of genes in Cofnas’s research. Genetic explanations seem always to encounter enormous resistance. Why do you think that is?

Interestingly, it is not the case that genetic explanations tout court encounter resistance at left-progressive universities. Take sexual orientation: the idea that genetic factors play a role is widely accepted, whereas suggesting that environmental factors may also be relevant is considerably more sensitive. For many other human traits, however, things are indeed different.

I am not an expert in this field, but I do have some ideas about why this is. One reason, I think, is the misconception that genes completely determine who we are. As the well-known behavioural geneticist Robert Plomin emphasises, genetic influences are generally probabilistic rather than deterministic. That means they increase or decrease probabilities but do not completely determine the outcome.

'I am not far-right. In the most recent elections in Ghent, after following the recommendation of an online voting guide, I voted for Groen'

Another reason is historical. Genetic research is associated by some with eugenics and the atrocities of the Nazi regime. But recognising the influence of genes by no means necessarily leads to support for far-right politics. Kathryn Paige Harden, for example, has fairly recently defended a left-wing policy of socioeconomic redistribution in the United States on the basis of insights from behavioural genetics.

It is also worth mentioning that blank slate ideologies, which see human beings predominantly as products of their environment, have likewise been used to justify sweeping social experiments accompanied by serious human-rights abuses. The fact that we in Western Europe have never lived under a communist dictatorship is, I think, one reason why we are less sensitive to that danger.

You yourself have meanwhile also come under considerable fire. One of the claims is that you are ‘far-right’.

I am not far-right. In the most recent elections in Ghent, after following the recommendation of an online voting guide, I voted for Groen. A significant part of my work, including research published during my time in Ghent, also defends positions that are more progressive than conservative. For example, I have argued for new rights for neurodiverse individuals. I have also written an article about when we ought to avoid microaggressions. And, in a somewhat more light-hearted piece, I criticise urinating while standing up. That is a form of toxic masculinity, if you ask me. (laughs)

At the same time, I do hold certain views that some people regard as right-wing or even far-right. Journalists sometimes pretend that I only began expressing such views publicly after joining Ghent University, but that is nonsense. Before working here, for example, I had already published articles defending the French burqa ban, criticising multiculturalism and defending certain cultural traditions involving black face paint.

Incidentally, I find the practice of dismissing people as far-left or far-right questionable. Such labels are often inaccurate. And ideas that were once regarded as extreme have sometimes later turned out to be correct, or at least defensible. That alone is a reason to maintain a broad academic and societal debate.

The atmosphere in your department strikes me as problematic. You requested security because of the death threats you and Cofnas have received. Professor Sigrid Sterckx responded sarcastically and copied the entire department into her reply. Not every member of the department appreciated that, and one of your colleagues consequently passed the email on to the media. Do you experience Sigrid Sterckx’s behaviour as bullying?

Where possible, I prefer not to comment on individual members of the department. But there has indeed been an unwelcoming working environment for quite some time. My department chair warned me about this two and a half years ago: as long as part of my research continued to deal with controversial issues, he said, I would be a ‘pariah’ within the department. Earlier this year, my image on the department’s group photograph in the coffee room was damaged. Notes were also stuck to the department’s windows calling for ‘mobilisation’ against me. And when I greet colleagues in the corridors, it is by now not unusual for some of them not to respond or even to look away.

Things used to be very different. At the end of January 2024, my department chair was still sounding me out about potentially becoming chair of the department in the future. Not long afterwards, however, Apache and De Morgen published hit pieces about my appointment of a PhD student who studies policies concerning reproductive technologies from liberal and Confucian perspectives. That was when the tide turned. Some colleagues were up in arms, and I was asked not to attend a specially convened meeting so that questions for me could be collected. However, I never received the questions I had been promised. Instead, requests were submitted to the rectorate and the Commission for Research Integrity to investigate my work; both concluded that there was nothing wrong with it. I was also removed, without prior notice, from the mailing list of the bioethics working group, whose meetings I had always attended.

What effect has the controversy surrounding Cofnas had on academic freedom and freedom of expression at Ghent University?

That is difficult to assess. In any event, these freedoms were already in poor shape before Cofnas started working at Ghent University. Not long after I myself began working here, students and professors from various departments regularly told me in confidence that they felt unable to speak freely about politically sensitive issues. This was particularly true of those who lean to the political right. I raised my concerns about this within my department several years ago and later at faculty and rectorate level as well, but they were never taken seriously.

'Philosophers are supposed to subject dominant views to critical scrutiny'

Someone in a senior position told me that I ‘had been hired to bring in research funding, not to change things within my department’. Others simply told me that I was imagining the problem. When I raised the issue at a meeting, one of those present remarked that ‘there was an impression that right-wing students do not feel at home in our programmes and therefore often drop out in their third year’, only to add, quite shamelessly, that they ‘thought that was a good thing’. And when I suggested paying greater attention to conservative thinkers in our teaching, one of the responses was that this was unnecessary ‘because everyone already gets Vlaams Belang leaflets through their letterbox’.

I certainly do not want to suggest that all my colleagues think this way. But I find it telling that the ideological climate is such that some people feel free to make statements of this kind, and it accords with my own experiences. I have studied or worked at ten different universities in eight different countries, but nowhere have I experienced such a stifling ideological climate as at Ghent University.

Have you yourself become more cautious in recent months about what you write, research or say publicly?

Not at all. Although I always try to express myself with nuance and to avoid misinterpretations of my work, I have never shied away from controversial subjects that I consider socially important. Nor will I ever do so. That would, after all, be contrary to my professional duty. Philosophers are supposed to subject dominant views to critical scrutiny. That does not always make you popular — just consider the resistance encountered in their own time by Socrates, Spinoza and Bertrand Russell — but winning a popularity contest is not my priority.

How do you see the coming months? Do you think Cofnas still has a future at Ghent University? And what do you expect this affair to mean for your own position?

I think Nathan certainly has a future at Ghent University, and I would very much like to keep him here for longer than a year. Apart from being an exceptionally talented researcher, academics with heterodox research interests and views are extraordinarily scarce in Flanders, as Andreas De Block discusses in his recent book. With the departure of Cornelis J. Schilt from the VUB, my former postdoc Maarten Boudry from Ghent University and, earlier, Johan Braeckman, who was also affiliated with Ghent University, the situation has only become more acute. Nathan’s departure would therefore be a major loss for the Flemish academic world.

As for my own position, I do not expect this affair to change very much. In any event, I have no intention of leaving. I am working on numerous interesting papers and supervise five — soon six — ambitious and talented researchers. Besides, the number of professions in which one can respectably wear tweed to work is fairly limited. (laughs)